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Abstract

This paper investigates the factor markets, namely, the land,
labor, and credit markets in China's rural areas after the
household responsibility system reform. It is found that the
institution of the household-based farming system created an
allocative inefficiency and the factor markets are a necessary
mechanism for improving the resource allocation in rural areas.
Most restrictions on the functioning of factor markets have been
removed; however, the existences of factor markets are still very
limited. As the extent of land market and labor market crucially
depends on the extent of credit market, the limited transactions in
the land and labor markets should be explained by the
underdevelopment of credit market, which may be due to the fact
that lenders' rights are not protected. In order to facilitate
factor market transactions, the Chinese government may have to
change its position on the lenders'-rights.

Rural Factor Markets in China
After the Household Responsibility System Refor~

Justin Yifu Lin
Yale University

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is a study of rural factor markets in China.
Transactions in factor markets were severely constrained by government
policies in the past. Recent reforms in rural areas, however, have
brought exchanges in factors to life again.
Traditionally, Chinese peasants, like their contemporaries in
other Asian countries, were not unfamiliar with factor markets. In
fact, a whole spectrum of market exchanges in land, labor, and credit
existed in complex forms in rural China before the socialist
revolution. 1 Nevertheless, the cooperative movement, starting in the
195Os, collectivized land, labor, and other resources and made market
exchanges in land and labor between households impossible. Private
credit exchanges were also severely limited. Rent and interest were
taken as means of capitalist exploitation and the labor force was not
to be treated as a commodity that could be bought or sold; therefore,
market exchanges between two collective farming units were also
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prohibited.
Under the collective system, a production team, usually
consisting of about 30 neighboring households, was generally the basic
unit of production and income distribution. The team was entitled to
all factors of production. These factors were allocated under the
unified management of a team leader with the exception of small
private plots reserved for households' use in their spare time.
Peasants, working under the supervision of a team leader, were
credited with work points for a day's work that they had done. At the
end of a year, net team income was first distributed among team
members according to basic needs, then the rest was distributed
according to the work points that each one had accumulated during the
year. This institution was found to be very inadequate in providing
work incentives to peasants in a production team. 2
A new policy called the production responsibility system was
introduced at the end of 1978 as one element of a package of reforms
aiming at improving agricultural production in rural areas. 3 At first,
this policy was designed to improve the management and incentive
problems within a team. However, it developed into a specific form now
called "the household responsibility system" that dissolved the
production teams and restored individual households as units of
agricultural production and accounting. The household responsibility
system evolved into the main feature of the recent reforms in the
Chinese rural areas. It is found that the shift from a production team
system to the household responsibility system on the average increased
the agricultural productivity about 20%. This jump in productivity
2

explained about 60% of the output growth in agricultural production
between 1980 and 1983. 4
The improvement in incentive, nevertheless, may have
simultaneously created allocative inefficiencies. When the household
responsibility system was introduced, land and other resources in a
team were in most cases allotted to each household in proportion to
its size. Therefore, for the households in a team, their land-person
ratio was equalized after the household responsibility reform.
Households are at different stages in the life cycle. They thus have
different endowments of family labor. In addition, households differ
in abilities. An equal land-person ratio across households in a team
thus does not fully equalize land-labor ratio across households. If
each household faces the same production function, this egalitarian
allocation of land will result in disparities in the marginal products
of land and labor across households. 5 These differences in marginal
products represent an allocative inefficiency. Output can be increased
if resources are reallocated.
One possible way to take advantage of these opportunities is
through direct government intervention, like land-reallocation among
households.

Nevertheless, government intervention can be ruled out as

an alternative for the near future. When the household responsibility
system was first introduced, the land contracts in general ranged from
1 to 3 years. When an original contract expired, land was reassigned
and adjusted according to changes in household size and labor
endowment. This practice was soon found to be impractical. As land
might be assigned away in next contract, each household thus lacked
3

incentives to invest in land improvement and to maintain properly the
soil fertility. To overcome this disincentive in land investment and
land maintenance, the Chinese government has adopted a policy of
lengthening the contract of land usage to each household for up to 15
years or longer.
The other possibility for improving allocative efficiency is
through market transactions. Market transactions can range from hired
labor to land tenancy or may be packaged in complex contracts
involving several transactions in different markets. Transactions in
land and labor naturally will give rise to demand for credit. If
factor transactions are costless, certain, unconstrained, and
enforceable, then marginal products will be brought into equality by
market transactions. However, as discussed by Binswanger and
Rosenzweig, factor transactions in rural areas are characterized by
risk and beset with incentive problems. 6 The existence of well
developed rural factor markets cannot, therefore, be taken for
granted. This paper is devoted to examining the extent and possible
developments in rural factor markets in China.
Before going into any detailed discussions, three specific
features that characterize China's rural factor markets need to be
mentioned:
a) The rural reform in China has gone through the first stage,
which featured the individual household responsibility system. By the
end of 1983, 94.5% of rural households in China had adopted this new
system. 7 The Chinese government launched a second-stage reform in
1984. The main theme of the second-stage reform is to transform a
4

self-subsistence economy into a commodity production and exchange
economy by way of readjusting the production structure in rural areas
through market mechanisms. When the household responsibility system
was first introduced, hiring labor, subleasing land, and lending money
at high interest rates were all explicitly prohibited. 8 Since then
there have been substantial changes. The first change came to the
credit market. Private credit with a high interest rate is no longer
categorically classified as usury in the 79th document issued by the
State Council in 1981. Leasing out land to other farmers and hiring
workers within a limited number (less than eight) were also formally
sanctioned in Document No. 1, issued by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China in 1984. Transactions in factor markets have
been legalized. However, socialist sentiment is still deeply rooted in
China. It appears unlikely, for example, that the government will
force a person to be evicted from his house if he uses it as
collateral and fails to repay his loan. It is also unimaginable that
public opinion will sympathize with the lender in the case of a
default.
b) There is a commonly held belief in China that at least 30% of
the labor force in rural areas is surplus labor. The argument is that
the cultivated land per capita in 1949 was 2.7 mu and now it has
shrunk to about 1.6 mu. However, the percentage of labor force remains
in rural areas has been about the same during this period. If the
surplus labor is defined as the labor force that can be removed from
agricultural work in the peak period without reducing agricultural
output, the accuracy of this belief is very doubtful. There have been
5

tremendous investment in land improvement. The usages of chemical
fertilizers and other modern inputs have also increased greatly. It is
hard to imagine that the marginal productivity of labor in the Chinese
rural areas could be zero or negative in the peak period. A more
accurate way of expressing the situation would be that, under the
current price system and the average operational landholding, the
value of marginal product of labor in agriculture, especially in
cropping, is much lower than that in non-agricultur al sectors;
therefore, there is a general tendency for the rural labor force to
shift out of agricultural sector. A study shows that the average net
income per worker in the suburbs of Shanghai in 1981 was Y 441 for
agriculture, Y 1,003 for sideline production, and Y 1,625 for
industry. 9 The differences in incomes across sectors should also be
similar in other regions. This income differential will thus induce a
tendency for the labor force to move out of the agricultural sector.
c) The original production teams are still entitled to the
ownership of land after implementing the household responsibility
system. However, the use right of land is assigned to individual
households for a period of 15 years or more. This practice created a
situation very similar to the distinction between "topsoil right" and
"subsoil right." The "subsoil right" represented the usual, original
claim to land ownership, including the right of sale, but excluding
the right of cultivation. The "topsoil right" was the right to
cultivate a piece of land, which could also be leased or sold. Hence,
in fact, two distinct rents, one for the subsoil right and the other
for the topsoil right, were involved.lo The entitlement to a use right
6

of land for 15 years, therefore, is a sufficient condition for land
market transactions.
II. LAND ALLOCATION AND LAND MARKET
The differences in the marginal products of land and labor in
China have two major sources. One is the differences in land endowment
across regions. The other one is the egalitarian distribution of land
after the household responsibility reform.
Table lA shows that the eight provinces that have the lowest
land-labor ratio possessed 39.6% of the total labor force in China in
1983; however, they only had 21.4% of the total cultivated land. On
the contrary, the 9 land-rich provinces possessed only 10.5% of the
total labor force but were endowed 34.1% of the total cultivated land.
The peasants in land-rich Helongjiang Province on the average had
about 17 times as much land as the peasants in land-poor Zheijiang
Province. Not only is the distribution of cultivated land unequal
among provinces, but it is also unequal within a province. Table lB
shows that, in Anhui Province in 1983, 31.8% of cultivated land
located in nine prefectures that had 22.9% of labor force. In
contrast, the six prefectures that had the lowest land-labor ratio had
21.7% of the labor force but only 13.6% of the cultivated land.
Although the differences within Anhui Province are not as large as the
differences among provinces, the disparities are still quite
substantial. The peasants in Huaibeishi have 3.6 time as much land as
the peasants in Anqingshi. The differences in land-labor ratio reduce
after adjusting for irrigation (proxy for land quality) and multiple
cropping (proxy for climate and temperature). However, the differences
7

are still very substantial as the last columns of tables lA and lB
suggest. Although, without empirical studies, it is difficult to say
to what degree land endowments differ across neighboring production
teams, the difference itself can be taken as a fact. The distribution
of inherited intelligence of a large population approaches normal in
any large sample. There is no a priori reason to believe that the
average quality of the labor forces in two neighboring teams, which
both have about 100 workers, would be significantly different. 11

It

thus should not be too unrealistic to assume that the quality of labor
forces across teams and regions is the same. Consequently, much of the
differences in the land-labor ratio represent an allocative
inefficiency.
Allocative inefficiency within a team, however, would arise from
an opposite reason. Under the production team system, the team-owned
land was divided into collectively farmed plots and private plots.
Private plots were allotted to each household according to its size.
The land that could be allotted for private plots varied from time to
time. The average amount of land in private plots nationally was 5.7%
in 1978. It rose to 7.1% in 1980. 12 After the introduction of the
household responsibility system, the collectively farmed land was
contracted to individual households in two different categories. One
was the "food ration plot." The other one was the "responsibility
plot." The difference between these two kinds of plots was that a
household had to pay only state tax on the food ration plot, but it
also had to pay the public accumulation fund, public welfare fund, and
other duties to its team on the responsibility plots. As for the
8

private plot, the state tax was also waived. Two different practices
were used to contract the collectively owned land. The first practice
contracted the land strictly in proportion to the size of each
household. The second one took into account both the size and the
labor force of each household. However, the results of these two
practices may not be very different. A survey of a production team in
Guangxi Province found that the household with the largest labor force
only had 0.16 mu per capita more than the average of the team, and the
household with the smallest labor force had only 0.078 mu per capita
less than the average of the team, even though 70% of weight was given
to the labor force in the contracts. 13 Therefore, it can be assumed
that the land-person ratio across households in a team is roughly
equal no matter what practice has actually been adopted. Not only is
the quantity of land per capita equal across households, but the
quality of land owned by each person in a team is also the same. This
is because land was first graded according to its quality, then each
person received a piece of land from each grade. Therefore, each
household in China after the individual household reform often owns
more than 10 strips of land. 14 Households in a team are at different
stages of their life cycles and thus have different labor endowments.
They also have different level of education, experience, and other
abilities. As a consequence, the equal land-person ratio across
households in a team generates a potential allocative inefficiency. A
survey of 235 households in a village in Sichuan Province found that
25% of households with a rich labor endowment did not have enough land
to farm; 6% of households did not have enough labor to work on their
9

land; and 4.7% of households were good at other trades, so they did
not want to work on their land. 1 5
Land transactions in China's rural areas after the household
responsibility reform are restricted in their form of lease. The
government has encouraged the households specialized in cropping to
consolidate their landholding. 16 Table 2 summarizes several studies
concerning the extent of land transactions in certain regions in
China. Rows 1-3 are based on the surveys done at the end of 1983 and
rows 4-5 are based on the data collected at the end of 1984. Column 2
is the percentage of households in an area that either leased out
their land to other households or returned their land to their
production teams. The land returned to a production team may be
recontracted to other households. Column 3 shows the percentage of
land in an area that was involved in land transactions. The percentage
of land involved is less than the percentage of households involved.
This is due to the fact that most households only leased out or
returned their responsibility plots and kept their food ration plots
and private plots.
All these studies found that land transactions were more active
in areas closer to cities. Tianjin is the third
China.

But even by the

end

largest city in

of 1984, only 8.3% of land

was

transacted in Tianjin; therefore, land transactions in China as a
whole must have existed with only a very limited scope up to now.
These studies also found that the majority of households that
leased out or returned their land were "specialized households" that
engaged in noncrop jobs, such as transportation, repairing, food
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processing, other services, or fish-, poultry-, and pig-raising. Only
a very small portion of households leased out or returned their land
because of lack of labor endowment. From the supply side, we find that
the scope of land transactions crucially depends on the job
opportunities outside cropping.
Although the extent of land transactions is very limited, the
forms it takes are more extensive. They can be classified into two
basic forms: (a) without compensation or (b) with compensation.
In the first case, households either give their land back to
production teams or give it to their relatives or close friends. In
either situation, households still maintain their claim over the use
right to the land. They can take it back in the future if they desire.
Rent over use right is positive (see the discussion later). Households
voluntarily give up the rent entitled to them. This fact implies that
(1) the land market in these places must not have existed, so the
households that want to migrate out of agriculture could not find
other households to lease it and (2) that the labor market or the
credit market had also failed, so the households could not find
workers to farm their land or did not have enough cash to hire
workers.
For the cases with compensation, there are two main varieties:
(1) rental and (2) sharecrop. Fan reported that in Fujian Province
there were three ways in which rent was paid. 17 In one case the
households that leased out land were guaranteed the right to purchase
a certain amount of food grain at the government procurement price.
Because the government procurement price was lower than the market
11

price at the local fair, the difference between these two prices
became rent. Fan found that rent paid in this way was equivalent to Y
64.86 per mu. In the other case, the households were compensated with
a given amount of free grain, ranging between 200-300 jin of grain.
Fan found that the market value of it was about Y 60 per mu. In still
another case, rent was paid in cash at also about Y 60 per mu. In all
these cases the rent was about 30% of the gross value of output. Fan
also reported a case of sharecropping. A bee-raising specialized
household leased out its land of 5.2 mu and lent Y 300 to the renter
for the cost of seeds and fertilizer. The renter harvested 5,600 jin
of rice. For the required quota, 1900 jin were sold for Y 320 to the
government. This money was paid back to the landholder for the Y 300
loan. The rest of the 5,600 jin were equally shared by the landholder
and the renter. The rent amounted to Y 129.27 per mu according to the
market value of rice at the local fair. In the other study of a county
in Zhejiang Province, Zhou and Du found that fixed rent was paid in
two ways. 18 The rent was equivalent to Y 57.7 per mu when a household
was guaranteed the right to purchase a certain amount of grain at the
government procurement price. It was about Y 52.5 per mu at the local
fair price for rent in the fixed amount of free grain. The rent was
also roughly about 30% of the gross value of output. Zhou and Du found
that there was a tendency to use the rent in the fixed amount of free
grain. They also recorded a case that a household hired casual workers
to farm its land. The net income per mu for the landholder in this
case was Y 77.97. That was about 30% higher than the prevailing rent.
There are several interesting relations in these cases:
12

a) Rent in cash was a little bit lower than rent in kind. This
may be explained by the facts that cash is preferred because of its
general purchasing power and that the price for grain at local fairs
may fluctuate, so there is some risk inherent in rent in kind.
b) Among the rent in kind, the rent was lower if it was paid by a
fixed amount of free grain than if it was paid by a fixed amount of
grain at the government procurement price. This again may be due to
the fact that the landholder has to face larger risk because of the
possibility of price fluctuation at the local fair.
c) The return to land was higher

for a landholder if he hired

workers to farm it instead of leasing it. This can be explained by the
fact that a landholder has to face the risks arising from production
and market fluctuations and that he also contributes his
entrepreneurshi p to production.
d) The land market is tied with the credit market in the case of
sharecropping, as reported above. The return from leasing to the
landholder depends on how the interest rate is calculated. In Chinese
rural areas the interest rate is extremely high for private credit. It
ranges between 4%-10% per month or even higher. Because the interest
of the loan to the renter was not explicitly paid, after deducting the
implicit market interest rate, the rent for the sharecropping case was
not as high as it appeared to be.
All the above relations are expected from the standard economic
theory.
In the Chinese rural land market, a long term lease with advanced
payment of the present value of all rent for the use right of land for
13

15 years has not been found. For a household leaving agriculture to
establish a noncrop business, this kind of transaction should be
attractive. It is a good way to overcome the possible cash constraint
for starting a business. The lack of such transaction can only be
understood from the demand side. There are two possible explanations.
One is that land cannot be used as a collateral because the government
will not enforce a lender's right by helping him repossess the land in
case of default. In general, the cash-rich households in China are
households specialized in non-crop activities. From the above
discussions, we find that they are the households that would like to
leave their land. The households that will like to expand their
landholding are, in general, those households that stay in the crop
sector. They are more likely to be cash-poor. Therefore, unless they
can borrow from a credit market, they will not be able to finance land
buying. Credit markets will be limited if land cannot be used as
collateral. 19 Therefore, a cash-poor household will not be able to
finance the transaction if they cannot use the purchased land as
collateral. The other explanation is that the government will not
protect such kind of contract, if the leasing household fails in
nonfarm undertaking and tries to take its land back. Therefore, even a
household is not constrained by cash requirement, it may be still
reluctant to expand its landholding through such kind of transaction.
III. RURAL LABOR MARKETS
Transactions in labor are another way to equalize differences in
marginal products across regions and households. Labor-hiring was
prohibited before the recent reform. When labor transactions are
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prohibited, migration between teams and across regions can be another
way to bring marginal products into equality. However, as rent was
suppressed in a collective system, workers

were compensated with the

average net product instead of the marginal product. Consequently, a
portion of their income actually was rent. Workers in a team with a
lower average income certainly have the incentives to migrate to a
team with a higher average income. They would be able to receive the
same higher average income as the original members in the higher
income team. Nevertheless, the workers in a higher-income team would
be reluctant to accept migrants from other teams for fear that their
rent would be shared by the newcomers. 20 Therefore, when payment of
marginal product to workers was prohibited, the migration between
production teams or across regions was virtually nonexistent.
When the household responsibility system was first introduced,
hired labor was explicitly prohibited on the grounds that exploitation
of the surplus value was not allowed to be restored. 21 Nevertheless,
labor-hiring can be mutually profitable for both the employers and
employees. With such underlying incentives, it is difficult to enforce
the decree. As more and more cases of hired labor appeared and the
government realized labor transactions were beneficial for the economy
as a whole, the policy was revised to allow hiring labor. Yet a
household is limited to hiring not more than eight workers. The limit
of eight workers is chosen because once Marx wrote in Capital that a
person who hired less than eight workers could not be classified as a
capitalist, as he still had to attend to the physical work himself.
The arbitrarily set limit has never been strictly abided by. Some
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households in rural areas have hired more than 100 permanent
workers. 22 While the upper limit of eight workers is still officially
maintained, the government does not seem to enforce it. 23
The opening of labor markets makes the equalization of marginal
products across households possible by way of labor transactions. What
is of interest is to what extent the difference in marginal products
has been narrowed. A survey of labor-hiring in Wu County, Jiangsu
Province, found that more than 50% of the labor hired was used in
nonagricultura l work (see Table 3). In Wu County the majority of labor
were hired for civil engineering or manufacturing. The major impact of
opening labor markets in Wu County is thus the increase in job
opportunities within the non-farm sector. Another survey of labor
hired in Yangshi County, Shenyangshi, Liaoning Province

has the same

finding (see table 3). The impact of labor-hiring on narrowing the
differences in marginal productivity across households is ambiguous
for the workers hired for non-farm jobs. Non-farm jobs often require
special talents; hence, from the supply side, the

labor working for

non-agricultur al jobs is not necessarily coming from households with
more labor endowment. However, from the demand for agricultural
workers, three kinds of households may hire workers: (a) households
specializing in stock-raising, fish-raising, or vegetable cultivation;
(b) households renting large amount of land; (c) households keeping
some of their labor force at homes for farming but having shifted the
major part of their labor force out of agriculture. The first two
categories indicate that the labor-hiring households have superior
technology or entrepreneursh ip in agricultural productions. The last
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one indicates that the remaining labor endowments in the labor-hiring
households must be less than the average. Therefore, from the demand
side, transactions in labor market tend to reduce the differences in
marginal products across households.
The first two categories of households usually hire workers on a
monthly or yearly basis. Zhang Songmao reported that a household in Wu
County rented 430 mu of land from its own and neighboring counties and
employed 18 workers for producing grain, watermelon, soybeans, and so
on. It also raised 550 chickens and ducks. The head of this household
was formerly a production team leader. 24 Zhou found that a household
in Hainan, Guangdong Province, rented a 300-mu sugarcane plantation
and hired 20 workers to run it. 25 The last category of households
usually hire casual workers either by piece rate or day rate. The wage
rate for a permanently hired worker was about Y 1000 per year in both
Zhang's and Zhou's studies. For the casual workers, Zhou and Du found
that the wage rate was about Y 5 per day in the peak period and about
Y 4 per day in the off-peak period in 1983 in Zhejiang Province. 26 Shi

found that the piece rate in the suburbs of Shanghai in 1979 was Y 15
to Y 17 for transplanting a mu of rice-seedlings. It was equivalent to

Y 2.5 to Y 2.8 per day.27
As discussed before, it was uncommon for a production team to be
willing to accept a migrant from the other teams or from the other
regions before the transactions in labor were legalized. Therefore,
another natural impact of opening labor markets was the migration of
labor across regions. A study found that by 1984 over 1,000 workers
had been employed permanently from other provinces to work in the
17

suburbs of Shanghai. Some of them worked in the village-run
industries. However, a substantial portion of them worked in vegetable
gardening, duck-raising and chicken-raising. A brigade was found to
have hired 85 migrant workers in 1984, it had planned to hire 50 more
in 1985. The migrant workers would consist of 56% of the labor force
in this brigade by 1985.2 8
Labor markets in China's rural areas are still very limited. 29
Furthermore, only a portion of labor hired in rural areas is actually
engaging in agricultural work. From the characteristics of households
that hire workers for agricultural work, we find that none of them are
households with the least family labor endowment before any market
transactions. From my observations, most households with the least
labor endowments solve their problem by growing crops with different
harvest periods, so the demand for labor at each peak period is
mitigated. If there are still shortages of labor in some period, they
engage in direct labor exchange with either neighboring households or
relatives and friends. The reason for this may be that hired labor is
subjected to incentive problems. The direct exchanges of labor between
relatives and friends mitigate the shirking problem and thus reduce
the cost of supervision. The other explanation is that hiring labor
requires cash. Only households with good access to credit markets or
high cash income have the ability to hire workers. As credit markets
in rural areas are not developed, households with the least labor
endowments will not have good access to credit markets. They are
obviously not households with high cash incomes. Therefore, households
with the least labor endowments may be unable to finance labor-hiring
18

because of the cash constraint.
IV. RURAL CREDIT MARKET
In the above two sections, it is found that the limited extent of
rural land and labor markets may be closely related to the limited
rural credit markets. The subsequent discussions focus on the extent
and constraints of credit markets in Chinese rural areas.
In a socialist society, there is a strong sentiment against the
taking of interest. In Marx's teaching, interest in a capitalist
society is a redistribution of the exploited surplus value between
financial capitalists and industrial capitalists. However, the
seasonality of agricultural production gives rise to seasonal needs
for funds to bridge gaps between receipts and expenditures. Both
formal and informal credit markets existed in rural areas even before
the household responsibility system reform (see the discussions
followed).
There are no private financial institutions in China. Formal
credits are provided by the Chinese Agricultural Bank and credit
cooperatives. The Chinese Agricultural Bank is a state bank. It has
branches in every commune. Credit cooperatives are formally owned by
commune members. However, credit cooperatives in the past, in reality,
acted as branches of the Agricultural Bank. In many areas, the
Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives shared the same offices and
had the same staff. 3 0 The credits were provided at subsidized interest
rates in the past. The interest rate charged for a loan was 0.25% per
month until 1981. However, the average interest rate for deposit was
0.312% in 1980. The government in Shanxi Province thus had to
19

subsidize Y 11.5 million for the Agriculture Bank and the credit
cooperative s in 1980 alone. 31 Not only were the interest rates charged
low, but loans were often provided without considerati on of their
prospects of recovery. For example, in Shanxi Province, only 84.6% of
loans between 1976 and 1979

were paid back. 32 The situation was not

better in the other provinces. According to national statistics, Y 4
billion of bad agricultura l loans were cancelled in 1961 and another Y
8 billion of bad loans were accumulated between 1962 and 1980. 33 The
availabilit y of credit was thus severely limited. A survey of several
counties in Henan Province found that, due to poor recovery, each
county had only about Y 2 millions for new loans although each of them
were officially allotted more than Y 10 millions for agricultura l
loans. 34
The results of low interest rates and low pressure for repayment
are not hard to figure out. Credits were not used with care. For
example, in Linfen county, Shanxi Province, Y 140,000 of agricultura l
loans from credit cooperative s before 1978

were not used properly.

Among these loans of Y 140,000, Y 100,000 were used on constructio n
that had never been completed; Y 20,000 were expended on unusable
materials; and Y 20,000 were wasted on administrat ive expenditure s. 35
The other result is credit rationing. As interest rates were low and
pressures for repayment were not strong, real opportunity costs for
using credits were close to zero or even negative. Therefore, the
demand for credits was definitely higher than the supply of credits.
The market could thus not possibly be cleared without non-market
measures. The criterion for rationing varied from time to time.
20

Sometimes the priority was to help poor teams. At other times the
priority was given to rich teams that had better uses for the funds. 36
However, it was often found that a county leader used ad-hoc criteria
in deciding who should be given a loan. 37
The availability of formal credit declined because of the
accumulation of bad debts and because of the unwillingness for people
to deposit in credit cooperatives. 38 However, the demand for credits
increased sharply. Taking Gansu Province as an example, total
agricultural income increased 107% between 1956 and 1979, yet
production expenditures increased 278%. In 1956, expenditures
consisted of 21% of gross income, it increased to 39.2% in 1979. The
situation in other provinces was no better.

Statistics involving 3.6

million production teams in 26 provinces, provided by the Agricultural
Bank, showed that in 1980, on the average a production team had only
15% of the required working funds. Another survey showed that about
40% of the production teams in China did not have any working funds at
all. Since formal credits could not satisfy the need for working
funds, many production teams had to rely on private credits. The same
report showed that in some regions as much as 70% of the production
teams engaged in informal credit markets. 39 The interest rates paid
for private credit were extremely high in some areas.

One such case

was recorded in a study of Dancheng County, Henan Province. The study
found that the combined revenues for production teams was Y 21.76
million between January and September 1979, yet the expenditure was Y
36.33 million. Half of the deficit was financed by loans from the
Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives. The other half was borrowed
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form private sources. Seventy percent of the credit borrowed from
private sources was used to purchase fertilizer, 20% was used to buy
livestock, the remaining 10% was paid for administrative expenditures.
The interest rates ranged from 3% per month to 30% per month. On the
average, it was 10% per month. 4 0 Zhang in another study, however,
showed that the interest rates only ranged between 2-5% per month. 41
Private credits were mainly provided by members in the borrowing
production team. Among the 256 people lending money to a production
team in Miluo County, Hunan Province, Zhang found that 235 were
members of this team, 18 were cadres and government staff (not team
members), and 3 were urban residents.
Before the household responsibility reform, the majority of
credits from the Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives were given
to production teams. Borrowing and lending between individual
households were also rare. A study found that of the Y 3.03 million
private credit in Xingmin County, Liaoning Province, January through
May 1980, 1.3% was between state firms and production teams, 3.3% was
among different production teams, 93.7% was between production teams
and individual households, and only 1.7% was among different
individual households.42
The individual household responsibility reform brought dramatic
changes in rural credit markets. In the production team system, an
individual household would not need credit for production purposes. If
a household had emergency needs for consumption, health, marriage, and
so forth, its production team was more or less obliged to take care of
them. The loans from a production team to individual households, in
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general, were interest free and were not required to be paid back
until the households were able to do so. The household responsibility
system restored the individual household as the basic unit of
production and accounting. It also eliminated the group insurance
provided by the production team system. Therefore, individual
households became the primary actors both in formal and informal
credit markets. For the nation as a whole, among the Y 16.6 billion
loans from credit cooperatives in 1983, 46% were given to individual
households. The figure was only 19.6% in 1980. 43 The actual new
credits to individual households should be higher than this figure
suggests because many of the loans to the collectives were old loans
that had not been repaid.
The other new feature in rural credit markets after the household
responsibility reform is the sharp rise of the amount of cash in
circulation. This is partly because of a marked price rise for
government-purchased agricultural products in 1979 and partly because
of

remarkable output growth since 1978. This feature is reflected in

the dramatic increase in deposits in credit cooperatives. The deposits
in credit cooperatives by individual households were Y 7.8 billion at
the end of 1979. This figure rose to Y 32.0 billion at the end of
1983. Most of the increased deposits were redeposited in the
Agricultural Bank as reserve. Between 1978 and 1983, deposits in the
credit cooperatives increased by Y 6.46 billion annually, however,
loans from credit cooperatives increased only by Y 2.42 billion. It is
suggested that the fact that loans increased by less than deposits was
due to the inertia of credit cooperatives. 44 However, It may be due to
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the fact that a local rural financial institution has to keep a high
reserve ratio in order to prevent illiquidity. The seasonality of
agricultural production leads to synchronic timing of deposits and
withdrawals. Covariance of yield risk leads to covariance of default
risk. Therefore, a local financial institution has to keep high
reserve ratio to keep liquid.4 5
As production expanded after the individual household
responsibility reform, the demand for working funds also increased
sharply. A survey of 21 households located at Xiachai Village, Ningdu
County, Jiangxi Province, carried out by Mei 46 found that per capita
cash income was Y 59.25 in 1978 and Y 209.66 in 1983. Meanwhile, the
total money borrowed in the sample was Y 415 in 1978 and Y 3,870 in
1983. The weight of borrowed cash in total cash income was 7.4% in
1978 compared with 20.5% in 1983. As the availability of formal credit
was limited, private credit was the major source of rural credits. Mei
reported that in Ganzhou Prefecture and Jiujiang Prefecture, both of
Jiangxi Province, private credit was two time as much as the credit
from the Agricultural Bank and credit cooperatives. Zhang Zhiping47
making another survey of 20 households in two counties in Helongjiang
Province, had the same findings. Zhang's survey is summarized in Table

4.
Zhang Zhiping

also found that about 40% of private credit was

used to buy draft animals, tractors, chemical fertilizer, and
pesticides for grain production; about 50% was used for expanding cash
crops, husbandry, and other production; and about 10% was used for
repaying matured loans and for consumption. The terms of credit for
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grain production in general did not exceed 10 months and for other
production did not exceed 1 year. Private credit was obtained (a) from
relatives or close friends; (b) from neighbors in the same village
directly or through middlemen; and (c) from residents in other
counties through middlemen. All private credits in rural areas
depended on oral agreements. No explicit contracts were written.
Furthermore, no collateral was found in private credit. The interest
rates charged depended on the relationship between borrowers and
lenders, creditworthiness of borrowers and middlemen, and the expected
returns of investment. The rate was about 3% per month for loans
between close friends and about 5% per month for others. 48 Mei,
however, found that in some cases the interest rates were as high as
10% or even 15% per month.49
While a 3%-5% of interest rate per month for private, short-term
agricultural production loans is not uncommon in other developing
countries and also before the revolution in China's rural areas, 50 the
interest rates were much higher for other types of private credit. Liu
and Liang reported that the interest rates faced by private
enterprises ranged between 4%-10% per month; some were even as high as
20% per month. 51 In a society where high interest rates have been
condemned for so long, it is an interesting phenomenon that private
interest rates could be so high.
A feature that merits special attention is that no collateral is
found in private lending and borrowing in China's rural area. While
the use of collateral is also not very often in informal rural credit
markets in other developing countries, the nonexistence of collateral
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at all is unusual. If collateral is used, the interest rate charged
will be smaller because the risk of default declines as the value of
collateral increases. The lack of collateral will also severely limit
the extent of the credit market from both the supply side and the
demand side. Lenders have to charge high interest because of the risk
of default. However, the risk of default is a function of, among other
things, the interest rate charged and the loan size. The expected gain
for lenders may go down as the interest rate increases. Therefore,
even though a borrower is willing to pay high interest rates, he may
not be able to find someone to borrow from. From the demand side, the
market may also disappear because the higher the interest rate is, the
harder it is to find investment opportuniti es that have high enough
expected returns. 52 Where loan sizes are large it would be beneficial
for both borrowers and lenders to utilize collateral. In China's rural
areas, there is no lack of private property that can theoretical ly be
used as collateral. Houses are always privately owned. After
implementin g the individual household responsibil ity system, tractors,
pumps, mills, trucks, draft animals, and livestock are also all owned
by individual households. Furthermore , the use right of land that
lasts 15 years or more is a property that could be traded and
therefore serve as a collateral. The lack of collateral in China's
rural credit markets can only be explained by the reluctance of
lenders to accept it. 53 Although the interest charged for private
credit is legalized in China, the ideology is still strongly
unfavorable toward lenders. Public opinion will definitely sympathize
with a borrower in the case of unintended default. The Chinese
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government is not prepared to enforce lenders' rights by evicting the
borrowers or assisting the lenders in repossessin g the assets in the
case of defaults. The absence of collateral in China's rural credit
markets is consistent with Binswanger and Rosenzweig' s thesis that the
collateral value of an asset depends on the legal environment .
Because of the lack of use of collateral, several forms of tied
contracts appear in rural China, as in countries where suitable
collateral do not exist. A landholder may provide credit to his tenant
at a very low interest rate as part of a land contract, as mentioned
in the discussion of land markets. A third party guarantee is also
often seen when borrowers and lenders are not relatives or close
friends. It is also found that some private enterprises require new
employees to invest in the firms as a preconditio n for hiring. 54
However, the most powerful guarantee for a lender in China's rural
areas may be the threat of losing future borrowing opportuniti es when
a borrower does not repay the loan. The rural population in China is
relatively immobile. Information on default will be transmitted
quickly to all potential lenders. Because insurance is absent in rural
areas, access to credit provides an important substitute for
insurance. Therefore, the loss of future borrowing opportuniti es is a
very high cost for any borrower.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The household responsibil ity reform in China's rural areas has
resulted in remarkable growth in agriculture . The success of the rural
reform prompted the Chinese government to push the market-orie nted
reform to its urban economy. Meanwhile, the rural reform has also
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reached the second-stage. The urban economy is much more complicated.
Any policy, good or bad, will not manifest itself in a short period. A
policy essential for the long run may even cause great difficulties in
the short run. Therefore, whether the market-oriented reform in urban
areas will be persistently carried out may again depend on the
performance of the rural reform. The gain in incentive efficiency
brought about by the household responsibility reform should have been
exhausted. The potential for a sustained high growth rate in
agriculture in the coming decade lies in improving allocative
efficiency. Factor markets, namely, land markets, labor markets, and
credit markets are important institutions for improving resource
allocation.
Most barriers for factor market transactions which existed before
the household responsibility system reform have been cleared. Land can
be leased out for rent. Interest can be charged for credit. Labor can
be hired with a limitation that is not enforced. However, land, labor,
and credit markets in rural China are still of a very limited extent.
The main reason may be due to the fact that lender's right is not
protected by the government; therefore, lenders have to charge high
interest rates to offset the risks of default.
On the one hand, the average landholding in China's rural areas,
in general, will not produce an income comparable to the income from
other sectors. Therefore, there is a general tendency for a household
to shift out of agricultural sector, especially cropping. On the other
hand, the egalitarian allotment of land after the household
responsibility reform provides a safe shelter for every household.
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Unless a household is secured with a job that produces an income
higher than cropping, it will not render its land to the other
households. Because there also exists a labor surplus in urban areas,
it is almost impossible for rural labor to find jobs in state or
collective enterprises in urban areas. Outmigratio n from cropping
sector will be possible only if a rural household starts its own non
cropping business, such as fish-raising , or nonfarm business, such as
transportat ion, or finds a job in rural private enterprises that have
emerged after recent reforms. Limited credit at very high interest
rates will greatly reduce the possibility of profitable private
businesses for households with a relatively poor cash endowment.
Therefore, a limited credit market may result in a limited
outmigratio n from cropping and, therefore, land markets are limited
from the supply side. Labor markets may depend on credit markets
almost in the same way as land markets. The average landholding is
very small. Most households do not have enough land to farm.
Therefore, unless a household rents in additional land from households
moving out of cropping or has its own major labor force moving out of
cropping, it will not hire workers for agricultura l work. Hence, no
matter if labor is hired for agriculture or non-agricul ture, labor
markets will be thin if nonfarm and noncrop job opportuniti es are
limited by credit markets.
If the government changes its position on lenders' rights in the
case of default, it is predictable that the supply of credit will
increase and interest rates will reduce. The opportunity for
profitable business outside cropping will thus expand. The threshold
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for outmigration from the crop sector becomes easier to overcome. As a
consequence, the scopes of outmigration from cropping, land markets,
and labor markets, and the possibility of resource allocation through
factor markets will all increase. Nevertheless, the government may
have to tolerate the emergence of a landless population. If lenders'
right is protected by the government, then among other things, the use
right of a piece of land for 15 years will become acceptable as
collateral. Since foreclosure implies loss of access to land,
protection of lenders' right may lead to some households becoming
landless. At present, the government does not seem to be willing to
undertake a policy with such consequences. However, rent, hired labor,
and interest were all not acceptable to policy makers a few years ago;
they are all legal now. Therefore, it is not unimaginable that in a
few years the Chinese government may change its position on enforcing
lenders' rights.
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TABLE lA
LAND ENDOWMENT IN EACH PROVINCE
(1)
Province

Labor

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Cult.

Land-

%

of Area

Multiple

Effective

Land

Labor

Irrigated

Cropping

Land-Labor

Index

Ratio

Ratio
Guizhou

10,087

28,480

2.8

24

153

3.8

Sichuan

38,712

98,109

2.5

47

181

3.9

Zheijiang

14,030

27,249

1. 9

84

252

4.0

Yunnan

12,808

42,488

3.3

34

140

4.3

Guangdong

19,061

47,130

2.5

65

200

4.4

Guangxi

13,963

39,301

2.8

54

177

4.4

Fuj iang

7,083

19,240

2.7

64

189

4.5

Tibet

825

3,437

4.2

53

93

4.6

Hunan

20,239

50,998

2.5

82

218

4.8

Henan

25,370

106,508

4.2

45

160

4.9

2,071

5,249

2.5

98

218

4.9

Anhui

17,478

66,518

3.8

so

177

5.9

Jiangsu

20,068

69,451

3.5

75

184

5.9

Shandong

24,988

107,728

4.3

63

146

6.1

Hubei

14,572

55,481

3.8

63

200

6.6

Tianjing

1,391

6,879

4.9

67

133

6.7

Beijing

1,372

6,343

4.6

81

151

6.9

17,481

98,551

5.6

54

131

7.3

Jiangxi

9,305

35,753

3.8

74

229

7.4

Shaanxi

9,124

56,377

6.2

33

127

7.6

Qinhai

1,104

8,640

7.8

27

87

7.7

Liaoning

6,488

54,814

8.4

19

102

8.9

Gansu

5,841

53,425

9.1

24

98

9.5

Shanxi

6,647

58,076

8.7

28

107

9.6

Ningxia

1,061

12,605

11.9

28

101

12.8

I.Mongolia

4,657

75,974

16.3

20

91

16.3

Jinin

3,845

60,895

15.6

18

100

16.3

Shanghai

Hebei

40

(Table lA--continue)
Xingjiang

2,570

47,422

18.5

83

92

21.4

Heilongjiang4,1 10

131,273

31.9

7

98

32.1

SOURCE: China Agriculture Yearbook 1984.
NOTE: (1) Agricultural labor force excluding workers in village
run industry, unit= 1,000 workers;
(2) cultivated land unit= 1,000 mu;
(3) col.2/col.l;
(4) % of cultivated land irrigated;
(5) unit=%;
(6) effective land-labor ratio is the land-labor ratio adjusted for
irrigation and multiple cropping; its formula is:

effective land-

labor ratio= Land-labor ratio x (1 +%of area irrigated/4) x (1
+( Multiple cropping index- 100)/2). See A. M. Tang, An Analytical
and Empirical Investigation of Agriculture in Mainland China 19521980 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984) for the
rationale of these adjustments.
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TABLE lB
LAND ENDOWMENT IN EACH PREFECTURE, ANHUI PROVINCE

(1)
Prefecture Labor

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Cult.

Land-

% of Area

Multiple

Effective

Land

Labor

Irrigated

Cropping

Land-Labor

Index

Ratio

Ratio
Anqing

85

126

1.5

88

215

2.9

Huizho

705

1,192

1. 7

76

248

3.5

Anqing

2,094

4,859

2.3

66

211

4.2

Tongling

124

297

2.4

95

200

4.5

Wuhu

697

1,736

2.5

77

224

4.7

Maanshan

297

756

2.5

93

225

5.0

Chaohu

1,527

4,355

2.9

80

199

5.2

Liuan

2,004

6,706

3.3

68

171

5.2

Fuyang

4,363

16,915

3.9

24

166

5.5

764

2,246

2.9

65

222

5.6

1,172

4,183

3.6

72

172

5.7

390

1,522

3.9

57

174

6.1

1,669

7,913

4.7

29

158

6.5

Huaibei

416

2,208

5.3

11

160

7.1

Chuxian

1,297

6,250

4.8

68

165

7.4

844

4,542

5.4

47

162

7.9

Xuancheng
Hefei
Huainan
Suxian

Bangbu

SOURCE: Statistical Bureau, Anhui Province.
NOTE: Definitions and units are the same as in Table lA, except
labor force here includes workers in village-run industry.
Data are for 1983.
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Table 2
SCOPE OF LAND TRANSACTIONS IN SOME AREAS

Household involved (%)

Land involved (%)

4

2.6

5

3

Xiapu County
Fujiang Provincea
Ezhoushi
Hubei Provinceb
Huangni Township

12.2

3.3

Chuzhou, Anhui Provincec
Zhongwei County

0.058

0.025

Ningxia Provinced
Tianjine

8.3

SOURCE: a: Fan, Genxing. "A Survey of the Approache s Used in
Recontrac ting Land," Fujiang luntan, 7 (1984): 45-46.
b: Wang, Xinglong. "On Current Stage of Land
Recontrac ting in Rural Areas," Hongqi, 8 (1984): 24-28.
c: Hou, Changmin and Dou, Tanghou. "Permitti ng Land
Transfers Is Necessary for the Developme nt of
Productiv ity in Rural Areas," Jianghuai luntan, 4
(1984): 5-10.
d: Wei, Nong. "A Survey of the Concentra tion of Land to

the

Farming Expert in Zhongwei County," Ningxia
shehuikex ue, 1 (1985): 84-86.
e: Agricultu ral Departmen t, Communist Party of China,
Tianjin. "A Survey of the Situation in the
Concentra tion of Land," China Agricultu re Yearbook,
1985 : 409-11.
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Table 3
LABOR-HIRING IN WU COUNTY AND YANGSHI COUNTY

No. of household

No. of workers hired(%)

Wu County-5!
Total

356

Civil engineering

145

842 (40.6)

Manufacturing

112

651 (31.4)

52

303 (14.6)

8

52 (2.5)

Retailing
Stock-raising

2073 (100)

or farming
Transportation ,

39

225 (10.9)

fish-raising, and others
Yangshi Countyb
Total

105

Civil Engineering
Manufacturing
Retailing

970 (100)

5

277 (29.9)

27

143 (14.7)

6

19 (2)

Farming

48

439 (46)

Transportation

19

92 (18)

SOURCE: a: Zhang, Songmao. "A Study of Labor-hiring in Rural
Areas," Jianghai xuekan, 5(1985): 42-44.
b: Gao, Xuechen and Lu, Guozhi. "Adhering to the
Orientation of Socialist, Cooperative Economy and
Actively Guiding A Healthy Development of All Forms of
Economies," Nongye jingji (Shenyang) 5 (1985):
44

15-20.

Table 4
A SURVEY OF CASH EXPENDITURE AND TYPES OF CREDIT

County

Households

Cash Expenditure

Surveyed

on Inputs (Yuan) Bank and Credit

Credit
Private

Cooperative
Niujia

10

8,367

2,056

2,880

Chonghe

10

5,241

35

2,050

SOURCE: Zhang Zhiping, "A Survey of the Rural Private Credits in
Wuchang County, Heilongjian g Province," Jingji wenti
tansuo 7 (1985): 40-42.
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